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ABSTRACT 
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) forces deploy to Bahrain in 
support of ongoing operations in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility, attached to 
Commander Task Force 56 (CTF 56). The largest of these deployers are Naval 
Construction Battalions (Seabee), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Coastal 
Riverine Group (CRG). Each of these deploy with Construction Mechanics (CM), 
Enginemen (EN), Logistic Specialists (LSs), and other supporting military operational 
specialties to support and maintain common equipment in the execution of their missions. 
Therefore, the purpose of this project is to conduct a preliminary cost benefit analysis 
(CBA) to evaluate the feasibility and attractiveness of establishing an Expeditionary 
Maintenance and Logistics Facility in Bahrain. This facility will support Seabees, CRG, 
EOD, and other deployed NECC forces while reducing costs and improving efficiencies 
by pooling maintenance activities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) serves as the Type Commander 
(TYCOM) for the Navy’s Expeditionary Forces (NEF). While NECC is a relatively new 
command, NEF has been around since World War II and earlier. In January 2006, the chief 
of naval operations (CNO) established NECC to centrally manage NEF. NECC’s mission 
is to “man, train, equip and sustain NEF in order to execute combat, combat support, and 
combat service support missions across the full spectrum of naval, joint, and combined 
operations, which enable access from the sea and freedom of action throughout the sea-to-
shore and inland operating environments” (B. Garbert, personal communication, 
September 26, 2018). NECC was established “to provide a single advocate for this group 
of related military capabilities which will operate together when deployed and have related 
missions: to better align their man, train and equip process; to realize economy of scale by 
consolidating headquarters and centralizing the equipping function; to improve 
operationally from commonality of training” (B. Garbert, personal communication, 
September 26, 2018). 
CTF 56 is a forward-deployed Echelon IV command that exercises operational and 
tactical command of forces assigned. CTF 56 gained relevance in Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and has stayed relevant with the ongoing operations 
in the region. The importance of CTF 56 can be seen in how it contributes to NEF 
operations as they execute the maritime strategy under NAVCENT in the 5th Fleet Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) delivering the NEF’s competencies and its unique warfighting 
capabilities within the AOR when conducting contingency operations. Also, CTF 56 serves 
as the lead planner for coalition forces delivering NEF capabilities supporting theater 
missions. During crisis response, CTF 56 commands and controls tailored task groups 
comprised of some or all of the capabilities inherent in the deployed CTG 56.X elements 
through Adaptive Force Packages. Many of the lessons learned at CTF 56 have paved the 
way for other CTF and CTG across the globe employing NEF assets (R. Cullinan, personal 
communication, 2018).  
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Many within the NECC community have speculated that the maintenance 
landscape at CTF 56 could benefit from having a combined maintenance facility within the 
geographic area of the largest CTF 56 supporting units, more than likely at or around Naval 
Support Activity One (NSA 1) or Naval Support Activity Two (NSA 2), supporting both 
Civil Engineer Supporting Equipment (CESE) and Service-Craft and Boat Accounting 
Report (SABAR) maintenance. This facility could be manned by either personnel with 
permanent change of station (PCS) orders or temporarily assigned duty (TAD) orders. The 
permanent personnel would be attached to CTF 56 supporting their maintenance along with 
the rotating units supporting the overall Task Force’s maintenance with TAD personnel 
from the deployed units. All personnel would be conducting maintenance on a variety of 
equipment within their skill sets mutually supporting maintenance requirements across 
CTF 56.  
B. RESEARCH FOCUS QUESTION 
The question we address in this research is as follows: Is there a net benefit for 
NECC to combine maintenance support efforts in Bahrain for deployed forces? We 
conduct high-level preliminary analyses of a defined scope to assess maintenance 
consolidation viability to see if further, more detailed analyses are advisable. 
We identify the current operations across CTF 56 and assess Planned Maintenance 
System (PMS) requirements for deployed equipment and the maintenance personnel 
manning at each unit to see whether a centralized maintenance facility at CTF 56 would 
generate a net benefit across NECC’s deployed forces.  
C. RESEARCH PLAN 
The creation of an Expeditionary Support Unit (ESU) at a forward task force where 
multiple NECC units would deploy or be homeported had been discussed within the NECC 
community; part of that plan would include a combined maintenance facility. This plan 
was the inspiration of our project. Those within the NECC community requested that we 
look at CTF 56 because most of NECC’s different mission sets support the mission there. 
In this research, we investigate whether there is a net benefit to combining maintenance in 
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a central facility that supports all of the NECC forces under CTF 56, by looking at the 
commonality of equipment and their PMS requirements.  
The NECC organizations that make up CTF 56 each have their own equipment and 
maintenance personnel that they deploy with and maintain in theater. For this report, we 
take a look at the preventive maintenance requirements listed on the Maintenance 
Requirement Cards (MRC) for the primary gear and equipment in Bahrain including the 
maritime assets. We also look at all attached maintenance personnel who are responsible 
for doing the required PMS checks for the gear and equipment and review the combined 
man-hour costs associated with each of the tasks. We are not collecting corrective 
maintenance data except for a general assessment of corrective maintenance versus 
preventive maintenance, analyzing observed time spent by the maintenance personnel at 
each unit. After the data is collected, we conduct a preliminary assessment of the possible 
efficiencies and benefits of combining the maintenance efforts and personnel under one 
cohesive maintenance structure for all deployed NECC units under CTF 56.  
An ESU provides logistics support for EOD both at home and while deployed. They 
provide the following functions: armory, communication support, personal gear issue, 
medical support, CESE and SABAR maintenance and support, shipping and receiving, and 
movement of gear and equipment. 
Additionally, we highlight the constant Remain in Place and Transfer of Authority 
(RIP/TOA) of supporting units and equipment that is ongoing within CTF 56 and 
acknowledge that the numbers of maintenance personnel and equipment may change with 
each deployment. We also look at where those units are physically located as well as where 
they conduct maintenance within Bahrain. The data does not include corrective 
maintenance actions or time spent on other command obligations outside of preventive 
maintenance. 
We utilize data collected from units presently supporting CTF 56 to compare the 
equipment PMS man-hours to the maintenance personnel man-hours, to answer our 
primary research question: Is there a net benefit for NECC to combine maintenance support 
efforts in Bahrain for deployed forces? 
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D. SCOPE 
This report encompasses all the subordinate commands and detachments under 
CTF 56 in Bahrain, namely Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD/56.1), Naval Construction 
Force (NCF/56.2), Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG/56.3), Army 
Civil Affairs (56.4), Role 3 medical facility (56.5), Expeditionary Combat Readiness 
Center (ECRC/56.6), Coastal Riverine Force (CRF/56.7), Naval Expeditionary 
Intelligence Command (NEIC/56.9) and Embarked Security and Intelligence Teams 
(ESIT/56.11). Our analysis is focused on all PMS maintenance requirements and associated 
equipment that each unit maintains at the various facilities in Bahrain. We then compare 
and contrast all similar equipment, the number of maintenance-qualified personnel, the 
location of the facilities where maintenance is done, and the associated PMS requirements 
and schedules for each piece of similar equipment between the organizations. We do not 
include any leased or contracted vehicles or equipment that have maintenance included in 
the lease or contract.  
E. PURPOSE AND BENEFITS  
In this report, we analyze available data to see whether there are identifiable 
efficiencies that can be gained for the requisite PMS maintenance requirements and 
qualified maintenance personnel at the CTF 56 units in Bahrain. The purpose is to 
determine whether there would be any benefits for the organization as a whole if the 
deployed forces were to consolidate all maintenance activities under one centrally located 
sustainment facility instead of all units doing their own maintenance requirements 
separately in different locations.  
F. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
Since the implementation of CTF 56, each of the supporting units has for the most 
part operated independently, relying on their deployed organic maintenance and contracted 
support to conduct maintenance while deployed in support of CTF 56. With so many units 
conducting RIP/TOA, most of the mission equipment remains in theater as replacement 
forces come and go approximately every six months, resulting in a lack of continuous, 
sequential maintenance records that could be used for analysis. Additionally, there are 
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differences in how units log corrective maintenance, so we focus on preventive 
maintenance utilizing the Preventive Maintenance Schedule Tracking Software’s 
(SKED’s) scheduled maintenance boards and PMS cards. With so many separate systems 
using different means to track and display data, we are also not able to assess the historical 
data of these units. This report is an initial assessment of the overall maintenance efforts at 
the CTF 56 units in Bahrain, so there are numerous data elements and detailed information 
that do not fall within the scope of this report. For the maintenance personnel at the 
individual units, we are able only to evaluate the workload based on itemized PMS 
requirements for the equipment attached to them. We are not able to look at all other job 
and maintenance requirements the units are tasked with, such as incidental corrective 
maintenance, daily job assignments, meetings, and watch-standing. Because we are 
looking only at the similarity of equipment in this research, we are not able to evaluate the 
cost of setting up a sustainment facility or determine whether space is available in Bahrain 
for this type of structure.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MBA PROJECTS 
The NPS MBA project report by Reeves and Baker (2017) is focused on the 
expeditionary units under the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, which are also 
operationally attached to CTF 56 in Bahrain. While we are focused on maintenance activity 
support for expeditionary forces, this report is not the first to look at logistics for 
expeditionary forces or Expeditionary Logistics (EXLOG). We looked at previous research 
reports that have focused on EXLOG and reviewed some of the research methods and 
logistics frameworks they utilized to find areas that we may be able to build upon. One of 
the research reports we looked at concerning EXLOG was Reeves and Baker (2017), 
because it was the most recent MBA project we found on the subject and it dealt with most 
of the same subordinate commands under NECC. While we found this topic and command 
structure to be the most similar to our own, the Reeves and Baker (2017) report focuses 
primarily on Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) ESU commands and how the EXLOG 
and supply chain processes work at these commands in support of the MK-16 Under-Water 
Breathing Apparatus (UBA) for Navy EOD. While this report was very thorough and 
describes the NECC structure very well, the overall research method and focus was mainly 
on the EOD and how the MK-16 UBA is supported throughout the supply chain. 
Another Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) MBA project report also focused on the 
EXLOG aspects of EOD, but these students looked at Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NSW) logistics framework as well when they conducted their research (Kundra, Brown, 
& Donaldson, 2014). While this report is very thorough and laid out many different aspects 
of the overall supply chain, within EOD and NSW, it did not focus on maintenance efforts 
for expeditionary equipment or the manning involved (Kundra et al., 2014). Because of 
this, we were not able to utilize the same research methods, and the supply efforts they 
discussed are outside of our research focus.  
An older MBA project looked at improving EXLOG support in the Naval Central 
Command (NAVCENT) Area of Responsibility (AOR; Perez, Nilsen, Tessier, & Lugo, 
2004). They discussed the support for Operation Iraqi Freedom operations in Iraq as 
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already having a decent framework for logistics support, and the students wanted to expand 
similar support efforts for the expeditionary units throughout the rest of the AOR, primarily 
in Bahrain. This project was established by the Naval Operational Logistics Support Center 
(NOLSC) to establish a support system for independently operating expeditionary units 
that were not supported by the primary theater logistics structure (Perez et al., 2004). The 
expeditionary units in theater were primarily supported by CTF 53 during this time frame, 
along with a few other units, for all of their requirements. Because of the amount of time 
that has passed since this report was written and because many commands and capabilities 
have been created since its publishing, such as CTF 56, we were not able to use most of 
the findings from Perez et al. (2004). The efforts to support the individual expeditionary 
units are still valued much the same way today, but the framework and supporting units are 
not valid for our purposes.  
In much the same way as when Applegate (2006) wrote about EXLOG, the learning 
process for logistics specialists and Navy supply officers is “on-the-job and frequently on-
the-fly” (Applegate, 2006, p. 2) training. The latest addition of the COMNECC 4400 has 
done the best job so far to give the disparate organization under NECC a common logistics 
document with overarching guidance to guide those conducting EXLOG. Although 
Applegate (2006) does not go into the maintenance functions of a deployed unit, he does 
lay out themes one should consider when conducting expeditionary maintenance. Most of 
the publications cited in his original report have been updated or revised; there continues 
to be a lack of consolidated guidance that can only be addressed with time and experience 
conducting naval operations in austere environments (Applegate, 2006) 
B. NAVY PUBLICATIONS  
For our research on the maintenance processes utilized by the Navy for CESE, the 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) P-480 manual on the Management of 
Expeditionary Equipment contained detailed information for the type of equipment within 
our report. The manual includes information on the different maintenance facilities and the 
general capabilities at each level of facility maintenance for organizational, intermediate, 
and depot-level requirements. Organizational level is for basic maintenance requirements; 
the type of repairs increase in difficulty level and skill approaching depot-level 
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maintenance, which is done by service depots, authorized agents, or NAVFAC-designated 
overhaul points (DOP; Naval Facilities Engineering Command [NAVFAC], 2016). 
Organizational-level maintenance is the focus of our research report, as it is the lowest 
maintenance level and lays out the maintenance requirements that fall within the capability 
of the units, which is consistent with the deployed forces in Bahrain. The P-480 also lists 
specific equipment maintenance requirement actions that are to be performed on each piece 
of CESE gear belonging to the organization that is listed in our data analysis. These items 
fall within the PMS guidelines to provide commands with the tools to plan, schedule, and 
control preventive maintenance within their organization (NAVFAC, 2016). Two of these 
tools are the Maintenance Index Page (MIP) and the Maintenance Requirement Card 
(MRC), which both were developed to provide at least the minimum of preventive 
maintenance procedures to keep equipment within specifications to ensure longevity and 
control life-cycle cost. These procedures make up a large part of the PMS data that was 
helpful in our research.  
The manual goes into property book accountability and reporting procedures for 
Financial Accountability and Audit Readiness (FIAR) inspections, so that each command 
can track and try to meet the goals of the Department of Defense (DoD) strategic 
management plan of better financial management practices to better respond to the 
warfighter needs in the future (NAVFAC, 2016). While not an in-depth publication for 
everything needed for repairs and maintenance of CESE equipment, it does tell the user 
where to find other necessary procedures listed in separate manuals and publications for 
reference. 
C. CONDUCTING COST ESTIMATES, COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS, COST 
COMPARISONS, AND ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES  
Commander Ures (2014) authored the report an independent cost estimate and 
analysis of alternatives for basing in West Africa conducted by the Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis requested by U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). From the direction 
of the National Defense Strategy through Defense Strategic Guidance and down to SOF 
2020, SOCOM is charged with fostering trust with U.S. allies through quicker response to 
crisis by a more persistent presence through forward basing. In the analysis, four sizing 
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options were taken into account, supporting force sizes ranging from 20 to 643 personnel. 
No specific sites were selected for the West African camps, so Dakar, Senegal; the 
Republic of Djibouti; Morocco; and Manda Bay, Kenya, were reference sites used to create 
the most accurate assessment. The requirements for the facilities were established through 
collaborative interaction with stakeholders and assessments of other U.S. bases throughout 
Africa. Additionally, current policy guidance and information from building subject matter 
experts were included in the analysis. The analysis calculated the initial investment and 
annual recurring costs and then broke them down to per person costs for each of the four 
different-sized bases.  
The report’s purpose was to answer SOCOM’s question: What base size (micro, 
small, medium, large) offers the best value to satisfy the requirement for an ongoing 
security presence in the region? To answer the question, Ures (2014) conducted cost 
estimates, cost–benefit analyses (CBAs), cost comparisons, and analyses of alternatives. 
For the costing information, they compiled data from the region and made a few 
assumptions that were articulated in the study. The cost estimate was done to validate the 
best size of the base. The CBA was conducted to assess whether equipment should be 
forward deployed or shipped in with the unit during each rotation. The cost comparison 
was conducted on deploying troops from Europe or continental United States to West 
Africa. Ures (2014) then crunched the numbers in Excel and came to a well-founded 
conclusion. For the analysis of alternatives, he looked at having the personnel live on the 
economy either in commercial lodging or leased housing or flats, with a smaller secure 
working area.  
As he accounted for construction and sustainment costs for the facility, Ures (2014) 
used many DoD, Army, and Navy facilities documents/doctrines to support his claims on 
how the facility would be constructed, as well as the various project rates and ultimate costs 
incurred during the projects. Again, he supported his claim with sound reasoning and 
evidence relating back to the directives. He also acknowledged that there was no pricing 
guidance for a live-fire shoot house, so data from similar facilities were used.  
Area cost factors was another area where Ures (2014) used Unified Facilities 
Criteria (UCF) to start from a pricing baseline and then made well-reasoned assumptions 
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and provided evidence from a U.S. Embassy project in the western region of Africa as well 
as data from Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ). Again he provided a range of costs and 
settled on a comprehensive estimate through sound reasoning and supporting evidence. 
Ures (2014) accounted for design and build construction burdens required by the 
UCF and again spelled out and accounted for the additions of the different percentages that 
are added to all construction projects to pay for planning, supervision, inspection, and 
overhead, as well as required contingency funding for OCONUS projects. These 
percentages were called out in the write-up and did not just show up in the spreadsheet. At 
the end of the write up, a bulleted list provides the cost estimating ground rules and cost 
estimating assumptions, giving the reader a firm understanding of where the study came 
from and where it was headed. Finally, in his summary, Ures (2014) shows the cost 
comparison of initial investments, recurring costs, and total cost in relation to the different 
sized bases. He reiterates the assumptions and reasoning of the cost data, as well as analysis 
of TAD and transportation costs if personnel stay on the economy in commercial lodging 
or leased housing. The structure of this report was beneficial in constructing our research 
project (Ures, 2014).  
D. CONSOLIDATION AND CENTRALIZATION UTILIZING A CBA 
When researching pooling methods for logistics efficiencies, we looked at another 
article that explains how the U.S. Army distributed medical supplies for combat operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan over a 10-year period (Wesler et al., 2012). The researchers 
discusses how medical supplies are distributed through their own distribution network that 
is separate from how they receive things such as fuel, ammunition, and other such items. 
The research question in the article is whether or not consolidating the medical supplies in 
places like Qatar or Germany where they currently operate out of is more efficient as far 
as lower cost and better performance than operating in other locations where the United 
States has depots. The researchers looked at these two locations in comparison to shipping 
items from the United States or from depots in Kuwait. RAND Arroyo Center was asked 
to conduct an analysis to find out which locations would work best if we were to change to 
consolidating medical supplies for further distribution. The methodology utilized is a CBA 
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to decide whether changing operations from the current status quo is necessary or whether 
that change would just end up costing more money and lead to a degradation in service.  
Without cost data, we cannot use the same analysis metrics that were used by 
RAND, but the conclusion of the report however is a powerful reminder that the status quo 
may in fact be the best option even if it has its faults.  
The RAND study is based on the criteria of Performance and Cost. For a certain 
location to qualify as an alternative to how U.S Forces currently operate, the option had to 
meet or exceed current delivery timelines. To measure this, the researchers measured each 
segment in the supply chain from ordering, to processing the order, to shipping and 
receiving, just to name a few in the overall process. Each location was then considered 
from a cost analysis standpoint and whether any new options were more cost effective. 
This would include transportation cost, labor cost, and material construction cost if the U.S. 
needed to increase inventory stocks or the primary focus was changed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan. 
The conclusions in the report broke down each location and whether there were 
realized cost savings according to the decision criteria. The first location discussed was the 
United States and a Direct Vendor Delivery method of supporting directly from a vendor’s 
location and then shipping to Iraq or Afghanistan. Understandably this led to worse 
performance. The outcome was a 28-day lead time compared to 10 days for current medical 
supplies. Because of this, no other consideration was given, as it did not meet the first 
criteria looked at. Kuwait was the next location discussed in the context of determining 
whether the depots in Qatar should be relocated there. With the current focus on 
Afghanistan, any cost savings with this model were wiped out, and none of the other data 
supported Kuwait as having better, much less equal performance. Increasing stockpiles in 
Qatar was the next option looked at, as it would have at least a 20% increase in performance 
improvement on current inventories. However, the increase in the labor force required to 
handle that amount as well as the construction cost to add a significant amount of material 
to make the performance numbers that much better would increase cost overall, eliminating 
Qatar as an option. The last option looked at was consolidating material in Germany, which 
would have an increase in performance similar to consolidating in Qatar. This ended up 
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being the preferred option as it would have the highest cost reduction of $1–3 million 
annually. This option of increased performance and cost reduction does assume that 
Germany increases operations from five to seven days a week, which would increase cost, 
but by how much would depend on a military or local national workforce. A valuable 
takeaway from this article is to realize that it may not require a massive shift in how things 
are done to make a difference and achieve the objectives; it may just be a simple tweak in 
a few spots that have the most benefit. The end result may be discovering that the way 
things are currently being done is the most effective for now, especially if how the theater 
of operations will look like in the future is unknown (Wesler et al., 2012).  
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III. NAVY EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 
The following information provides an overview of the Central Command 
(CENTCOM), Commander 5th Fleet (5th FLT), Navy Forces Central Command 
(NAVCENT), NECC, and Command Task Force 56 (CTF 56) force structures and a brief 
explanation of each subordinate unit’s mission for the organization. 
A. NAVY EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT COMMAND ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
NECC is the headquarters for all United States Navy (USN) expeditionary combat 
forces around the world, as shown in Figure 1. It provides combat service support and is 
directly involved in combat operations in numerous sea and land operating environments. 
The NECC’s primary “mission is to organize, man, train, and equip expeditionary combat 
forces” (NECC, n.d.). that will deploy with the Navy or that are attached to a Joint Task 
Forces Combat Service Support (NECC, n.d.). 
 
Figure 1. Organizational Structure of NECC. Source: B. 
Garbert, personal communication, September 26, 2018. 
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B. COMBINED NECC/CTF 56 SUPPORTED ORGANIZATIONS IN 
BAHRAIN 
NECC maintains administrative command (ADCON) of the units as they deploy to 
CTF 56 continually even after they enter the theater. Central Command (CENTCOM) is 
the Combatant Commander responsible for all the operations conducted within the AOR. 
Under CENTCOM, the U.S. Navy 5th Fleet/NAVCENT are responsible for all U.S. and 
coalition naval assets within CENTCOM. CTF 56 falls under 5th Fleet/NAVCENT for 
both ADCON and operational control (OPCON). When NECC forces such as CRF, EOD, 
and NCF deploy to CENTCOM, they fall under CTF 56 for OPCON, and for their 
remaining time in theater they take all direction from CTF 56. The relationship between 
the COCOM, NECC, and CTF 56 can be seen in Figure 2. An illustration of how CTF 56 
is support by NECC and NECCPAC through its subordinate commands that deploy from 
NECC and NECCPAC can be seen in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2. Command Relationship between COCOMs, 
NECC/NECCPAC, and CTFs. Source: R. Cullinan, 
personal communication, September 5, 2018. 
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Figure 3. Organizational Chart of Commands under CTF 56. 
Source: R. Cullinan, personal communication, September 
5, 2018. 
1. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL 56.1  
EOD technicians are the Navy’s experts in rendering safe explosive devices, 
including improvised explosive devices; unexploded ordnance; mines; chemical, 
biological, radiological munitions; and any other munition that requires disposal. They 
deploy with Special Operations Forces (SOF) on land and sea to support SOF operators. 
They are both parachute- and diver-qualified, a unique combination compared to other 
military branches’ EOD technicians. Additionally, they are trained in underwater salvage 
and can perform clearance operations in sea lanes and harbors. Mobile Diving and Salvage 
Units fall under the purview of EOD Groups, and they specialize in search-and-recovery 
operations underwater, clearing navigation hazards in harbors, and performing minor 
underwater ship repairs (NECC, n.d.).  
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2. NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE SEABEES 56.2 
NECC’s Naval Construction Force (NCF) battalions—known as Seabees—provide 
a full range of construction capabilities that can be utilized in any civilian or hostile combat 
zone. They can adapt to almost any mission requirement to build bridges, roads, 
expeditionary camps, aircraft runways, and medical or port facilities, just to name a few. 
Seabees deploy to aid in preparation and recovery during humanitarian relief operations 
and nation-building projects in disaster-prone areas all over the world (NECC, n.d.). 
3. NAVY EXPEDITIONARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT GROUP 56.3 
The Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) is an operational 
reserve command responsible for EXLOG support to deployed forces at sea and ashore, air 
and surface cargo handling missions, fuel distribution, ordnance handling, contingency 
contracting capabilities, custom inspections, and postal services. The group organizes, 
trains, and equips active and reserve forces that are ready to support any number of 
operational requirements, including responding to humanitarian relief efforts and enabling 
Marine Prepositioning Forces (MPF) and Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) activities 
(NECC, n.d.). 
4. U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS 56.4 
The U.S. Army Civil Affairs (USA CAT) conducts targeted civil affairs operations 
supporting national objectives that shape the NAVCENT operational environment. They 
are capable of conducting civil affairs (CA) planning with host nation governments and 
militaries to build long-term stabilization and to coordinate and manage interagency 
partners. They help strengthen U.S. and coalition partner relationships, enhance civil 
defense capabilities and legitimize partner nation governments to their populations. CA 
assets provide foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) with food, water, shelter, and 
medical support (R. Cullinan, personal communication, September 5, 2018). 
5. NATO ROLE 3 MMU, AFGHANISTAN 56.5 
CTF 56 supports a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Role 3 
Multinational Medical Unit (MMU) combat trauma hospital in Afghanistan that serves 
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U.S. forces, coalition forces, and host nation citizens wounded in the region. The facility 
is set up to do a full assortment of lifesaving surgical stabilizations and comes with an 
intensive care unit and ward-size holding capacity. It is staffed by medical professionals 
consisting of doctors, nurses, and corpsmen trained in numerous medical specialties (R. 
Cullinan, personal communication, September 5, 2018). 
6. EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT READINESS COMMAND 56.6 
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center (ECRC) mobilizes Navy 
Individual Augmentees (IA) and Navy Reserve Forces in support of Overseas Contingency 
Operations. As the administrative parent command for IA sailors, ECRC coordinates the 
training requirements for deploying assets; interfaces with Navy component commanders 
about support requirements; and provides reception, staging, onward movement, and 
integration (RSOI) in the area of operations (NECC, n.d.). 
7. COASTAL RIVERINE FORCE 56.7 
The primary mission of Coastal Riverine Forces (CRF) is maritime security 
operations defending high-value assets, coastal and inland ports and harbors, and vital 
maritime infrastructure. CRF utilizes various medium-size patrol boats, ranging from 25 to 
85 feet, to perform maritime security operations in the littorals, operating in rivers, bays, 
and harbors. CRF can secure vital maritime infrastructure to support an amphibious landing 
or protect energy infrastructure, supporting trade and ensuring regional stability. 
Additionally, riverine units are trained to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, and river 
patrols to interdict smugglers of weapons and drugs. They also conduct High Value Asset 
(HVA) escort around the globe (R. Cullinan, personal communication, September 5, 2018). 
8. NAVY EXPEDITIONARY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND 56.9 
The Navy Expeditionary Intelligence Command (NEIC) forces are a capable and 
ready force that responds rapidly to irregular warfare intelligence requirements. They 
supply timely relevant intelligence information to expeditionary warfighters to restrict the 
enemy freedom of movement, deny them sanctuary, or the use of maritime lines of 
communication so the NEF forces can find, fix, and destroy enemy assets (NECC, n.d.). 
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9. EMBARKED SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE TEAMS 56.11 
Embarked Security and Intelligence Teams (ESIT) provide underway defense and 
gather visual intelligence and waterside security in port aboard HVAs while operating in 
NAVCENT. They are a permanent Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) supporting 
several different operations under both CTF 56 and CTF 53 for Military Sealift Command 
(MSC) vessels that operate in theater (R. Cullinan, personal communication, September 5, 
2018). 
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IV. CTF 56 MAINTENANCE 
In this chapter, we illustrate the different maintenance processes for the unit that 
has organic equipment assigned and the equipment is stationed at either Naval Support 
Activity Two or Isa Air Base. 
A. MAINTENANCE OVERVIEW  
Currently, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD/56.1), Naval Construction Force 
(NCF/56.2), Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG/56.3), and Coastal 
Riverine Force (CRF/56.7) bring their own maintainers and conduct their own maintenance 
at their various camps on Naval Support Activity Bahrain and Isa Air Base. Commander 
Task Force Five-Six (CTF 56) has a small table of allowance (TOA) equipment, and they 
utilize NAVELSG Detachment Maintenance Material Management Coordinator (3MC) 
and CTF 56 logistics specialists to conduct PMS requirements. These deployment sites 
located on the island of Bahrain are miles apart, and local traffic patterns make movement 
between sites arduous. NSA Bahrain and Isa Air Base are approximately 27 miles to the 
south and the routes go through the heart of Manama, which can be seen in Figure 4. 
Preventive maintenance is conducted on the unit’s equipment at the deployed location, and 
each unit has distinctive maintenance facility capabilities. These facilities contain tools, 
parts, and hazmat that the unit uses to conduct a RIP/TOA for items that were previously 
procured. For example, CTF 56.1,7,2 are supported from ESU ONE or ESU TWO, while 
Coastal Riverine Group Two N4/N43 and NCF support comes from the battalion main 
body in Rota, Spain. Additionally, the Preventive Maintenance Schedule Tracking 
Software (SKED) is not held locally, except for at CTF 56 proper, so when checks are 
completed, the check is entered into SKED at the home unit or main body headquarters 
outside of Bahrain. Currently, CTF 56 does not have any maintenance personnel assigned 
to it, so CTF 56 utilizes the 3MC from the deployed NAVELSG detachment to run its 
SKED and schedule its maintenance. Then logistics specialists from CTF 56 perform the 
maintenance to keep the equipment in good condition and operational. 
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Figure 4. Illustration of the Distance from NSA Bahrain to Isa 
Air Base 
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B. CTF 56 UNITS OVERVIEW 
For the 10 units including CTF 56 that conduct the preponderance of work at NSA1, 
NSA 2, or Isa Air Base, we were able to obtain PMS data from only four because they were 
the only ones that held and maintained their own equipment. Of those four units, we 
discarded the data from NCF, because NCF is located on Isa Air Base and there are 
significant barriers to entry and exit; additionally, the travel time between units is 
prohibitive. The three groups that remained were EOD, CFR, and CTF 56 proper.  
Some of the units we looked at under CTF 56 did not have any CESE or SABAR 
gear and equipment attached to their units or under an assigned TOA, so these units were 
not considered when looking at the pooling of units under a combined maintenance effort 
at CTF 56. These eliminated units include Army Civil Affairs (56.4), Role 3 medical 
facility (56.5), Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center (ECRC/56.6), Naval 
Expeditionary Intelligence Command (NEIC/56.9), and Embarked Security and 
Intelligence Teams (ESIT/56.11). The Expeditionary Logistics Support Group Detachment 
conducts operations in support of CTF 56 in Bahrain at Isa Air Base. The equipment used 
during these logistics operations is leased from and maintained by host nation vendors.  
The Naval Construction Group Detachment in Bahrain that operates under CTF 56 
is located out at Isa Air Base and is operated by the Bahraini military. Isa Air Base is 27 
miles away, and it usually takes over an hour with city traffic to get from Isa Air Base to 
NSA Bahrain. Because it is not a U.S. military base, any equipment coming on or off Isa 
Air Base has to receive special permission from the host nation before being moved. The 
Bahraini military restricts the number of military or government-contracted personnel who 
are granted access to the base, which is something we had to take into consideration when 
doing our analysis. As we analyzed the data we received from NCF, we realized that almost 
all of the equipment NCF uses on Isa Air Base is large, heavy-mover equipment for their 
primary mission, airfield repair; this is different from any of the other units under CTF 56.  
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C. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY PROCESSES 
In the following sections we examine the three main supporting units under CTF 
56 and examine their individual maintenance and supply processes in greater depth and 
detail.  
1. Naval Construction Force 
NCF receives logistics and SKED support from their main body located in Rota, 
Spain. All of the equipment at the detachment in Bahrain is owned and controlled by the 
NCG 2 unit that is on deployment to Rota. The bulk of the maintenance conducted in 
Bahrain for the NCF Detachment is PMS on large earth-moving equipment and other 
associated rolling stock that is deployed to Isa Air Base because they are there to conduct 
a particular mission set and only that mission set. Rotating units also conduct RIP/TOA 
approximately every six months on the NCF equipment located at Isa Air Base. All 
maintenance actions are coordinated through the Headquarters Element, which is located 
at Camp Mitchell on Naval Station Rota, Spain (J. Chambers, personal communication, 
2018). 
2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
Currently the EOD Mobile Unit (MU) that is supporting CTF 56 conducts 
maintenance as follows. During the training phases before deployment, the EOD MU is 
augmented with maintenance personnel from their respective ESU to support their 
maintenance requirements during the workup cycle and while they are deployed. When the 
EOD MU deploys, they conduct a RIP/TOA in country, with the outgoing EOD MU 
transferring all the equipment, tools, gear, and consumables to the new unit. The current 
typical deployment length is six months, with approximately one week of turnover time. 
When the RIP/TOA is complete, the new unit is responsible for all the equipment and its 
maintenance, reporting back to stateside commands the status of equipment and execution 
of preventive maintenance. The PMS boards are sent to the deployed EOD MU via email, 
and the completion of the maintenance is communicated back to the supporting ESU via 
email. The maintenance is conducted at the EOD compound on NSA 2, in the equipment 
yard or the one/single maintenance high bay. There is no dedicated maintenance area 
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within the EOD compound. Also, many of the light trucks and SUVs are leased from or 
through NAVFAC, and the leased vehicles’ maintenance is performed by NAVFAC or the 
leasing agency such as Avis.  
The deployed EOD Mobile Unit (EODMU) has a unique relationship with both 
ESU ONE and ESU TWO because of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between EOD 
GROUPs ONE and TWO and the split ownership of equipment/TOA that the EODMU 
inherits during the RIP/TOA process. According to the MOA, ESU ONE is responsible for 
the maintenance costs of parts, ordering, and shipping of roughly half of the equipment 
deployed to Bahrain in support of CTF 56, and the other half is supported through ESU 
TWO. This requires access to both ESU ONE and ESU TWO’s Relational Supply Database 
(RSUPPLY) and SKED maintenance boards, as well as coordination for funding to support 
operations. Also, maintenance technicians must ensure that they open the jobs within the 
correct maintenance system and that there is nothing to prevent ordering of a component 
for one ESU’s piece of CESE and then installing it on the other ESU’s piece of CESE.  
Major equipment exchanges are predominantly done during the RIP/TOA of two 
EODMUs to take advantage of the deploying/re-deploying unit’s cargo shipment.  
3. Coastal Riverine Force  
CRF deployed forces reach back to CRG 2 for all maintenance support functions 
such as funding and tracking of maintenance. CRG 2 owns all of the TOA equipment so 
there is no need for an MOA between the groups like EOD has. There is a covered and 
climate-controlled warehouse on NSA 2 where the deployed CRS conducts boat 
maintenance. The SKED and ordering support are provided by CRG 2 in Little Creek, VA. 
CRG 2 provides all funding and logistical support, regardless of the CRS that deploy from 
CRG 1 or CRG 2. They handle support all levels of maintenance to include contract support 
for depot-level maintenance. What we refer to as Craft 6 in our research and calculations 
below has its own cadre of maintenance personnel that is not shared with the rest of the 
CRF detachment; likewise because of specialized training and the quantity of maintenance 
that Craft 6 requires, the rest of the maintenance personnel do not conduct maintenance on 
Craft 6. Most of the maintainers work on other equipment because that is where the bulk 
of the maintenance is required. CRG 2 also holds contracts for vehicles leased through 
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NAVFAC on NSA 1 to support mission and personnel movement around Bahrain. Again, 
major equipment exchanges are conducted during the RIP/TOA as units deploy/redeploy, 
which is on an approximately six-month cycle (C. Lastie, personal communication, 2018). 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
In the below sections we illuminate our analysis and conclusion for our project. 
A. CASE ANALYSIS 
For the 10 units including CTF 56 that conduct most of the work at NSA1, NSA 2, 
or Isa Air Base, we were able to obtain PMS data from only four because they were the 
only ones that held and maintained their own equipment. Of those four units, we discarded 
NCF, because NCF is located on Isa Air Base and there are significant barriers to entry and 
exit; additionally, the travel time between units is prohibitive. The three groups that 
remained were EOD, CFR, and CTF 56 proper.  
In our analysis of the current structure of maintenance operations for each 
command, we took into account the number of personnel conducting maintenance at the 
unit, multiplied by the estimated 2,000 working hours’/maintenance hours per person 
available per year, utilizing the standard for calculated working hours for an individual. 
We used 2,000 working hours, based on a 40-hour work week multiplied by 50 working 
weeks a year. We estimated 50 working weeks to allow for some holiday time off and time 
for RIP/TOA that affects working hours. We normalized our data to look at all PMS checks 
in a 12-month time horizon, that is, monthly checks would be multiplied by 12, and a once-
every-24-months check would be multiplied by 0.5 to give us requirements in yearly 
maintenance hours. 
We also determined that most of the units are deployed and will not be using much 
leave time off during this time period. The following is an example of how we did our 
calculations: An average EODMU deploys to CTF 56 with five maintainers, so 5 x 2000 = 
10,000 maintenance hours per year. We then looked at the major pieces of CESE and 
SABAR PMS requirements of a 36-month time horizon and multiplied or divided the PMS 
hour(s) to normalize total hours per year for each check. For example, a light service 
support vehicle (LSSV) has 1.2 hours in monthly (1.2*12=14.4) PMS requirements, 1.5 
hours in quarterly (1.5*4=6) PMS requirements, 1 hour in required semi-annual (1*2=2) 
PMS requirements, and 3.9 hours in annual (3.9*1=3.9) PMS requirements for a total 
normalized yearly PMS requirement of 26.3 (14.4+6+2+3.9=26.3) hours per vehicle. We 
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summed all of the yearly PMS hours for each piece of equipment at a given unit to get the 
total PMS hours for the unit in a year time horizon. We then divided the total units’ yearly 
PMS hours by the total number of available maintenance hours to get a ratio to compare 
manning to PMS. A representation of the Excel spreadsheet can be found in Table 1. 
For each PMS check, we took the total hours of each PMS check and multiplied it 
by a normalized time period to compute one year’s worth of total maintenance hours 
adjusted per year for each piece of equipment. Calculations for each time periodicity is as 
follows: 
 Daily PMS: total daily PMS hours multiplied by 365 days in a year equals total 
daily PMS hours performed in a year. 
 Weekly PMS: total weekly PMS hours multiplied by 52 weeks in a year equals 
total weekly PMS hours performed in a year. 
 Monthly PMS: total monthly PMS hours multiplied by 12 months in a year 
equals total monthly PMS hours performed in a year. 
 Quarterly PMS: total quarterly PMS hours multiplied by 4 quarters in a year 
equals total quarterly PMS hours performed in a year. 
 Semi-Annual PMS: total semi-annual PMS hours multiplied by 2 representing 
two 6-month periods in a year equals total semi-annual PMS hours performed 
in a year. 
 Annual PMS: total annual PMS hours multiplied by 1 equals total annual PMS 
hours performed in a year. 
 18 Month PMS: total 18-month PMS hours multiplied by 0.75 to represent 18 
months normalized to a year equals total 18-month PMS hours performed in a 
year. 
 24 Month PMS: total 24-month PMS hours multiplied by 0.5 to represent 24 
months normalized to a year equals total 24-month PMS hours performed in a 
year. 
 36 Month PMS: total daily PMS hours multiplied by 0.333 to represent 36 
months normalized to a year equals total 36-month PMS hours performed in a 
year. 
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Table 1. Generic Calculations for Six LSSVs 
 
 
The calculation used is as follows: 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑀𝑆 𝐻𝑟𝑠
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑠
∗ 100 = % 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑠. 𝑃𝑀𝑆 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  
 
Another way of looking at the ratio would be  
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐻𝑟𝑠.
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑀𝑆 𝐻𝑟𝑠.
= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 ℎ𝑟𝑠. 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑀𝑆 ℎ𝑟𝑠.  
A figure larger than 1 would indicate a surplus of maintenance hours beyond PMS 
requirements, and a figure smaller than 1 would indicate a deficit in maintenance hours 
available to conduct PMS requirements. 
Additionally, we had the units determine their ratio of preventive maintenance to 
corrective maintenance to see if their general workload was consistent with our ratio of 
maintenance hours to PMS hours. The analysis of each unit follows. 
  
Equipment 
nomenclature Quantity 36M 24M 18M Annual 
Semi-













0.333 0.5 0.75 1 2 4 12 52 365
LSSV 6 3.9 1 1.5 1.2
0 0 3.9 2 6 14.4 0 0 0 26.3 157.8
Preventative Maintenance Scheduled Periodicity 
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1. EOD Analysis 
Because of the initial availability of EOD’s data, we first looked at the EODMU 
deployed in support of CTF 56. In our calculations, we utilized the five maintainers 
currently conducting maintenance at CTF 56.1. Then we estimated the total number of 
available man-hours that are worked for the year per person, which we estimated to be 
about 2,000 hours. We multiplied these two numbers together for EOD to get a total of 
10,000 man-hours available based on current manning levels. Then we compared the total 
number of man-hours available to the total number of combined estimated hours of PMS 
for each piece of CESE/SABAR equipment attached to the unit. For EOD, we calculated a 
total yearly PMS requirement of 5,637.40 hours spread across just the larger assets of 
CESE and SABAR equipment at the command.  
When we divided the total number of PMS hours of 5,637.40 by the total number 
of maintenance man-hours for all five maintainers of 10,000 hours, we came up with a ratio 
of 0.56, that is, 56 % of EOD’s maintenance time is spent just doing PMS on the equipment.  
PMS Ratio: (10,000 total man hours / 5,367.40 total PMS hours) * 100 = 56% 
This ratio closely coincides with the unit’s estimate that they spend about 60% of 
their time doing PMS and 40% doing corrective maintenance. The numbers and ratio of 
time spent doing maintenance and total man-hours available does not include any 
corrective maintenance requirements when a piece of equipment breaks down or requires 
replacement due to operating hours. It also does not include any other outside duties on the 
job such as watch station duties, Navy Knowledge Online training requirements, command 
physical fitness, meetings, and so forth. See the calculations in Table 2. 
For operational security purposes, we have masked our data by using CESE and 
Craft. CESE refers to all land equipment, and Craft refers to all waterborne equipment.  
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Table 2. PMS Calculations for Equipment Held by EOD Forces at CTF 56. Source: SKED (2018). 
 
Equipment 
nomenclature Quantity 36M 24M 18M Annual 
Semi-





















Ratio of: total 
yearly hours of 
PMS / total 
yearly man 
hours
0.333 0.5 0.75 1 2 4 12 52 365 5637.3978 1 2 2 2000 10000 0.56373978
CESE 1* 6 3.9 1 1.5 1.2
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 3.9 2 6 14.4 0 0 0 26.3 157.8
CESE 2* 6 2.4 2 4.5 2.7
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 2.4 4 18 32.4 0 0 0 56.8 340.8
CESE 3* 2 0.5 4.2 0.5 1.5
Total PMS Hrs 0.25 0 4.2 1 6 0 0 0 0 11.45 22.9
CESE 4* 4 6.2 0.5 1
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 6.2 1 4 0 0 0 0 11.2 44.8
CESE 6 1 4.2 0.5
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 4.2 0 2 0 0 0 0 6.2 6.2
CESE 7 2 4 2
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 0 4 0 8 0 0 0 0 12 24
CESE 8 5 1 6.2 0.5 1 1.5
Total PMS Hrs 0.333 0 0 6.2 1 4 18 0 0 0 29.533 147.665
Craft 1 8 1 0.5 5.3 28.9 2 2.7 1
Total PMS Hrs 0 0.5 0.375 5.3 57.8 8 32.4 52 0 0 156.375 1251
Craft 2 13 6 1
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 0 0 12 4 0 0 0 0 16 208
Craft 3 16 6 39.1 9 17.2
Total PMS Hrs 0 3 0 39.1 18 68.8 0 0 0 0 128.9 2062.4
Craft 4 22 0.1 0.5 1 3.7 2.1
Total PMS Hrs 0 0.05 0 0.5 2 14.8 25.2 0 0 0 42.55 936.1
Craft 5 16 0.1 4.4 0.8
Total PMS Hrs 0.0333 0 0 0 0 17.6 9.6 0 0 0 27.2333 435.7328
Preventative Maintenance Scheduled Periodicity 
* are similar equipment used across all tables
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2. CRF Analysis  
In our analysis of CRF, the number of personnel conducting maintenance at the unit 
was eight maintainers. Then we looked at the total number of available man-hours that are 
worked for the year per person, which we estimated to be about 2,000 hours. We multiplied 
these two numbers together for CFR to get a total of 16,000 man-hours available based on 
current manning levels. Then we compared the total number of man-hours available to the 
total number of combined estimated hours of PMS for each piece of CESE/SABAR 
equipment attached to the unit. For CRF, we calculated a total yearly PMS requirement of 
3,124.4 hours spread across just the larger assets of CESE and SABAR equipment at the 
command. We break this down between separate types of SABAR equipment referenced 
as Craft 6 maintenance and Craft 7 with all other CESE. 
For the Craft 6, we divided the total number of PMS hours of 1,225 by the total 
number of maintenance man-hours for all three maintainers of 6,000 hours; we came up 
with a ratio of 0.204, that is, 20.4% of their maintenance time is spent just doing PMS on 
the equipment.  
PMS Ratio: (1,225 total PMS hours /6,000 total man hours) * 100 = 20.4% 
Maintenance Hour Ratio: (6,000 total maintenance hours / 1,225 total PMS hours) 
= 4.9  
The maintenance hour ratio shows us that there are 4.9 times the required hours 
needed to conduct PMS. 
Again, for the Craft 7 and other CESE, we divided the total number of PMS hours 
of 1,899.25 by the total number of maintenance man-hours for all five maintainers of 
10,000 hours; we came up with a ratio of 0.1899, that is, 18.99 % of Craft 7 and other 
maintenance time is spent just doing PMS on the equipment.  
PMS Ratio: (1,899.25 total PMS hours /10,000 total man hours) * 100 = 18.99% 
Maintenance Hour Ratio: (10,000 total maintenance hours / 1,899.25 total PMS 
hours) = 5.265  
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The maintenance hour ratio shows us that there are 5.265 times the required hours 
needed to conduct PMS. 
This ratio closely coincides with the unit’s estimate that they spend about 25% of 
their time doing PMS and 75% doing corrective maintenance. The numbers and ratio of 
time spent doing maintenance and total man-hours available does not include any 
corrective maintenance requirements when a piece of equipment breaks down or requires 
replacement due to operating hours. It also does not include any other outside duties on the 
job such as watch station duties, Navy Knowledge Online training requirements, command 
physical fitness, meetings, and so forth. The calculations are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
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Table 3. PMS Calculations for General Equipment Held by CRF at CTF 56. Source: J. Wherry, personal 
communication, September 6, 2018. 
 
Table 4. PMS Calculation for Unique Equipment Held by CRF at CTF 56. Source: J. Wherry, personal 
communication, September 6, 2018. 
 
Equipment 
nomenclature Quantity 36M 24M 18M Annual Semi-Annual Quarterly Monthly Weekly Daily Special 
Total PMS Mhr 
per piece of 
equipment per 
year
Total PMS Mhr 
per year for 










Ratio of: total 
yearly hours of 
PMS / total 
yearly man hours
0.333 0.5 0.75 1 2 4 12 52 365 1899.25 2 2 1 2000 10000 0.189925
CESE 10 2 6 21.6 2.5 3 2.2
Total PMS Hrs 3 0 21.6 5 12 26.4 0 0 0 68 136
CESE 5* 1 3.3 2.7
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 3.3 0 0 32.4 0 0 0 35.7 35.7
Craft 7 6 1 16.3 4.1 61.5 21.4 35.3 2.6
Total PMS Hrs 0.333 8.15 3.075 61.5 42.8 141.2 31.2 0 0 0 287.925 1727.55
Preventative Maintenance Scheduled Periodicity 
* are similar equipment used across all tables
Equipment 
nomenclature Quantity 36M 24M 18M Annual Semi-Annual Quarterly Monthly Weekly Daily Special 
Total PMS Mhr 
per piece of 
equipment per 
year
Total PMS Mhr 
per year for 










Ratio of: total 
yearly hours of 
PMS / total 
yearly man hours
0.333 0.5 0.75 1 2 4 12 52 365 1225.125 0 3 0 2000 6000 0.2041875
Craft 6 3 3 18.6 26.1 82.3 30 22.7 12.2
Total PMS Hrs 0.999 9.3 19.575 82.3 60 90.8 146.4 0 0 0 408.375 1225.125
Preventative Maintenance Scheduled Periodicity 
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3. CTF 56 HQ Analysis 
We did not develop a PMS ratio for the CTF 56 Headquarters element, as it does 
not have dedicated maintenance personnel assigned to it. Currently, logistics specialists 
assigned to CTF 56 conduct PMS maintenance on the equipment assigned to CTF 56 to 
keep it operational. We did calculate that the addition of these duties take up approximately 
8% of each of the two assigned logistics specialists’ time based on the current assigned 
equipment; see Table 5.
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Table 5. PMS Calculations for Equipment Held by CTF 56. Source: SKED (2018). 
 
Equipment 
nomenclature Quantity 36M 24M 18M Annual Semi-Annual Quarterly Monthly Weekly Daily Special 
Total PMS 

















Ratio of: total 
yearly hours 
of PMS / total 
yearly man 
hours
0.333 0.5 0.75 1 2 4 12 52 365 336 0 2 2040 4080 0.082352941
CESE 1* 2 3.9 1 1.5 1.2
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 3.9 2 6 14.4 0 0 0 26.3 52.6
CESE 2* 1 2.4 2 4.5 2.7
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 2.4 4 18 32.4 0 0 0 56.8 56.8
CESE 3* 6 0.5 4.2 0.5 1.5
Total PMS Hrs 0.25 0 4.2 1 6 0 0 0 0 11.45 68.7
CESE 4* 10 6.2 0.5 1
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 6.2 1 4 0 0 0 0 11.2 112
CESE 5* 1 3.3 2.7
Total PMS Hrs 0 0 3.3 0 0 32.4 0 0 0 35.7 35.7
CESE 9 1 0.1 0.2 1.6 2.1
Total PMS Hrs 0 0.05 0.15 1.6 0 8.4 0 0 0 0 10.2 10.2
Preventative Maintenance Scheduled Periodicity 
* are similar equipment used across all tables
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B. CONCLUSION 
After reviewing the CESE and SABAR assets at each unit, we have discovered that 
there is little commonality between the NECC deployed units in Bahrain. Most NECC units 
OPCON or TACON to CTF do not have any organic equipment in Bahrain. These units 
lease equipment through NAVFAC on NSA 1, and all maintenance is performed by the 
leasing agent. The units that do have a significant amount of equipment to be maintained 
are split up between two separate locations on NSA 2 (EOD and CRG) and Isa Air Base 
(NCG), as displayed on the map in Figure 2. These units presently do not have a formal 
maintenance memorandum and only limited interaction at the organizational maintenance 
level. With their proximity on NSA 2, inside the same security perimeter, there is an 
opportunity for sharing resources for greater efficiency within CTF 56. 
Additionally, the EOD and CRF units’ cadre of equipment are dissimilar enough 
that we only found five nominal pieces of CESE common between them. The types of 
maintainers that deploy in support of CTF 56 share some similar skill sets that would 
support a mobile maintenance team that we discuss in our recommendations. Therefore, 
after doing our preliminary analysis, we do not see a net benefit to having a combined 
maintenance facility in Bahrain for deployed NECC forces supporting CTF 56 at this time.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter we provide recommendations derived from our experiences during 
the research process and our conclusions.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As stated previously, our analysis does not support a combined maintenance facility 
centrally located in Bahrain because of the lack of commonality of equipment and efforts. 
However, many of the same enlisted rates are required for conducting maintenance at each 
of the commands supporting CTF 56. Therefore, further research should look at a combined 
maintenance effort in the construct of a maintenance team at the CTF 56 level supporting 
units on NSA 1 and NSA 2. The maintenance team could be constructed utilizing both 
permanent change of station and temporarily assigned personnel. This could help 
normalize maintenance practices, tracking data and local knowledge and contracts, 
ultimately giving CTF 56 better purview of supporting units’ maintenance issues so they 
can provide support and continuity of effort as units deploy and redeploy in and out of 
theater.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As stated in our research question, this is a preliminary analysis and will require an 
in-depth review of each of the individual units under CTF 56 to be able to better compare 
requirements and capabilities. Additional data can be acquired to analyze the feasibility 
and benefits of an ESU-type construct focusing on personal gear issue, armory, and 
communications equipment in Bahrain and could include the cost–benefit of a combined 
maintenance effort for personnel to determine whether any manning efficiencies would be 
gained. 
Another research option to consider is a maintenance team located at CTF 56 
consisting of deployed maintenance personnel on TDY orders from each supporting unit 
and a cadre of permanent personnel PCS to CTF 56 maintaining permanent assets in 
Bahrain. This maintenance team could conduct maintenance on all deployed equipment 
within their military occupational specialty. Most of the PMS does not require a highly 
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skilled technician; a sailor basically trained in their military occupational specialty can 
conduct the majority of PMS requirements.  
Further research should include an assessment of space requirements, available 
land and construction costs of suitable locations for an ESU facility within Bahrain. This 
research will be required for a holistic view and will greatly impact any future cost–benefit 
analysis.  
Additional research on standardizing the collection and reporting of maintenance 
data across CTF 56 with a repository of the data collected in a maintenance management 
system held at CTF 56 is recommended for better visibility. We found in our research that 
a variety of methods were utilized to track and report maintenance data. A single system 
for the collection of maintenance data would be beneficial to produce a consolidated 
maintenance picture. 
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